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INTRODUCTION
The False Claims Act (FCA)1 and its qui tam provision2 allow
whistleblowers who uncover fraud against the government to bring a civil
action and assist in the recovery of assets.3 This little-known law has
become the government’s most powerful tool to combat fraud and is
responsible for the recovery of more than $59 billion since its amendment
in 1986.4 As with most things, the COVID-19 pandemic has impacted the
FCA and its qui tam practice. As of April 1, 2021, the federal government
allocated a total of $3.0 trillion to address the pandemic.5 The public must
rely on the FCA and its whistleblowers now more than ever to protect this
public investment. The FCA’s most avid proponent, Senator Chuck
Grassley, noted:
Today . . . we find ourselves in the midst of another crisis: the Covid-19
pandemic. And today, Congress and the American people depend on
whistleblowers to tell us about wrongdoing, just as much as our founding
fathers did. In fact[,] we depend on them more. Because as the government

* Gavin received his J.D. cum laude from Campbell University School of Law and is an
associate attorney with Flannery | Georgalis, LLC in Charlotte, North Carolina. His practice
focuses on government investigations, white collar criminal defense, and assisting clients in
the healthcare industry maintain compliance. Before joining Flannery | Georgalis, LLC,
Gavin represented whistleblowers assisting the federal and state governments combat fraud.
While at Campbell, Gavin served on the Board of Editors for Campbell Law Review, and he
extends his sincere thanks to the law review for their assistance in making this publication
possible, with special thanks to Kelsey Myers.
** Stacy is the principal of Miller Law Group, PLLC and heads the firm’s qui tam section.
He brings his extensive trial experience to help whistleblowers fight fraud. Also a graduate
of Campbell University School of Law, Stacy is committed to supporting the Campbell Law
community and currently sits on the law school’s Board of Visitors.
1. 31 U.S.C. § 3729 (2012).
2. 31 U.S.C. § 3730(b) (2012) (“A person may bring a civil action for a violation of
section 3729 for the person and for the United States Government. The action shall be
brought in the name of the Government.”). “Qui tam is short for the Latin phrase qui tam
pro domino rege quam pro se ipso in hac parte sequitur, which means ‘who pursues this
action on our Lord the King’s behalf as well as his own.’” Vt. Agency of Nat. Res. v. United
States ex rel. Stevens, 529 U.S. 765, 768 n.1 (2000); see also 3 WILLIAM BLACKSTONE,
COMMENTARIES *160.
3. 31 U.S.C. §§ 3729–3730.
4. Letter from Sen. Charles E. Grassley, Chair, Senate Fin. Comm., to Att’y Gen.
William Barr, Dep’t of Just. (May 4, 2020) [hereinafter Letter from Sen. Chuck Grassley to
Att’y Gen. William Barr].
5. COVID-19 Spending, USASPENDING.GOV, https://www.usaspending.gov/disaster/c
ovid-19 [https://perma.cc/7PBX-DUK8].
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gets bigger, the potential for fraud and abuse gets bigger. So does the
potential for cruel retaliation against the nation’s brave truth-tellers.6

This Article provides an overview of the FCA, discusses the effect that
the pandemic has on this area of law, and emphasizes the need for this
critical partnership between whistleblowers and the government. Part I will
provide an overview of qui tam practice and the history of the FCA. Part II
will briefly outline some of the legal doctrines at issue during the pandemic.
Part III will discuss some of the most common fraud schemes combated by
this act. Finally, Part IV will discuss several developments during the
pandemic that may implicate the FCA.
I. OVERVIEW OF THE FALSE CLAIMS ACT
A. Purpose of the False Claims Act
The FCA makes it illegal for individuals to submit “false or fraudulent
claim[s]” for payment to the government.7 Those who violate the Act are
liable for three times the amount of fraud—commonly referred to as treble
damages—and civil penalties between $5,000 and $10,000 for each
violation.8 While the Department of Justice (DOJ) may bring FCA actions
of its own accord,9 the FCA allows private individuals with knowledge of
fraud to bring a suit on behalf of the government.10 These whistleblowers
are known as qui tam relators.
The purpose of the FCA is to prevent fraud against the government and
encourage those with knowledge of fraud to come forward. The DOJ

6. Senator Chuck Grassley, Speech on National Whistleblower Appreciation Day (July
30, 2020), https://www.grassley.senate.gov/news/news-releases/grassley-celebrating-whistl
eblower-appreciation-day [https://perma.cc/8B5V-7JZP].
7. § 3729(a)(1)(A). While the submission of false claims is the primary act punishable
under the FCA, the act also prohibits similar fraudulent conduct, including making false
records or statements material to a false claim, § 3729(a)(1)(B), conspiring to violate the
FCA, § 3729(a)(1)(C), and others, § 3729(a)(1)(D)–(G).
8. § 3729(a)(1). The exact amount of civil penalties actually increases over the years
because they are subject to adjustment under the Federal Civil Penalties Inflation Adjustment
Act of 1990. Id. (citing Federal Civil Penalties Inflation Adjustment Act of 1990, Pub. L.
No. 101-410, § 5, 104 Stat. 890).
9. 31 U.S.C. § 3730(a) (2012) (“The Attorney General diligently shall investigate a
violation under section 3729. If the Attorney General finds that a person has violated or is
violating section 3729, the Attorney General may bring a civil action under this section
against the person.”).
10. § 3730(b)(1).
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estimated that fraud drains between as much as 10% of the total federal
budget.11 However, “most fraud goes undetected.”12 Various provisions of
the FCA are intended to encourage relators to bring allegations of fraud to
light. Most notably, relators are entitled to a portion of any monetary
recovery.13 The relator’s share typically ranges from 15–25% of the total
recovery, with the precise amount determined by the relator’s specific
contributions to the action.14 Given the large recoveries under the FCA’s
treble damages regime, the relator’s share serves as a powerful incentive for
would-be whistleblowers.15 The Act also provides relators an individual
cause of action if they suffer workplace retaliation as a result of their
whistleblower activities.16
The FCA’s relator’s share and whistleblower protections work to
encourage those who uncover fraud to come forward.17 Whistleblower
actions under the FCA account for 64% of all successful recoveries by the
government.18 Without the assistance of these whistleblowers, the majority
of fraud against public assets would go unaddressed. Wherever there is a
significant investment of public assets, whistleblower programs like the
FCA are necessary to ensure that those assets are used efficiently.

11. S. REP. NO. 99-345, at 3 (1986), as reprinted in 1986 U.S.C.C.A.N. 5266, 5268.
12. Id.
13. § 3730(d)(1).
14. Id. (“If the Government proceeds with an action brought by a person under
subsection (b), such person shall, subject to the second sentence of this paragraph, receive at
least 15 percent but not more than 25 percent of the proceeds of the action or settlement of
the claim, depending upon the extent to which the person substantially contributed to the
prosecution of the action.”). While this is the standard range for intervened cases, the relator
can receive a larger share—between 25–30%—if the government declines to intervene. §
3730(d)(2). Additionally, if the court finds that the relator planned and initiated false claims
they may be dismissed from the action and will receive no share of the recovery. §
3730(d)(3).
15. See, e.g., Press Release, U.S. Att’y Off. for the E. Dist. of Wash., Bechtel & Aecom,
U.S. Department of Energy (DOE) Contractors, Agree to Pay $57.75 Million to Resolve
Claims of Time Charging Fraud at Doe’s Hanford Waste Treatment Plant (Sept. 22, 2020),
https://www.justice.gov/usao-edwa/pr/bechtel-aecom-us-department-energy-doe-contractor
s-agree-pay-5775-million-resolve-0 [https://perma.cc/Q2E8-M3L5] (announcing a $57.75
million recovery with a relator’s share of $13.75 million).
16. § 3730(h).
17. S. REP. NO. 99-345, at 2, as reprinted in 1986 U.S.C.C.A.N. at 5266–67 (referencing
the need to “encourage any individual knowing of Government fraud to bring that
information forward”).
18. U.S. GOV’T ACCOUNTABILITY OFF., INFORMATION ON FALSE CLAIMS ACT
LITIGATION 5 (2006), https://www.gao.gov/new.items/d06320r.pdf [https://perma.cc/DTH25HDA].
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B. History and Development of the False Claims Act
As the FCA has developed over the years, Congress has had to balance
statutorily encouraging whistleblowers to come forward with avoiding
opening the door to frivolous actions. The FCA first emerged during the
Civil War as a response to the rampant fraud in wartime defense contracts.19
In 1863, the Union Army was repeatedly hampered by shipments of
inoperable or useless military supplies.20 This fraud included “defense
contractors who resold the same horses two and three times to the Union
cavalry, and who were paid for muskets but provided boxes of sawdust.”21
The response was a statutory scheme of harsh criminal and civil penalties
for defrauding the government.22
The original version of the FCA provided for double damages and a
$2,000 forfeiture.23 Relators under the early FCA were also entitled to
one-half of the total recovery and had a vested right in that recovery
regardless of any government action.24 However, they bore the onus of
paying for all costs and charges of the action.25 This simplistic version of
the FCA was poised for significant growing pains over its first century.
The FCA went through its first major development amid the copious
defense expenditures of World War II. While many successful qui tam
actions were brought during this period, the government was plagued by a
new issue: parasitic lawsuits brought by opportunistic relators.26 In one
case, the Government claimed that the relator learned of the fraud from a
criminal indictment and won the proverbial race to the courthouse ahead of
the Government’s civil attorneys.27 In an amicus brief to the Supreme
Court, the Government argued that opportunistic relators violated the spirit
of the Act and hampered the Government’s ability to recover assets.28
Although there was no finding of fact on whether the relator copied a
criminal indictment, the Court held that even if there was no independent
discovery of fraud, the relator did contribute by successfully prosecuting the
19. United States ex rel. S. Prawer & Co. v. Fleet Banks of Me., 24 F.3d 320, 324 n.8
(1st Cir. 1994) (citing S. REP. NO. 99-345, at 8 (1986), as reprinted in 1986 U.S.C.C.A.N.
5266, 5273).
20. See 132 CONG. REC. 22,339 (1986) (statement of Rep. Howard Berman).
21. Id.
22. United States ex rel. Stinson v. Prudential Ins. Co., 944 F.2d 1149, 1153 (3d Cir.
1991).
23. Id.
24. United States v. Griswold, 30 F. 762, 763 (D. Or. 1887).
25. S. REP. NO. 99-345, at 10–12, as reprinted in 1986 U.S.C.C.A.N. at 5275–77.
26. Id. at 10–11, as reprinted in 1986 U.S.C.C.A.N. at 5275–76.
27. United States ex rel. Marcus v. Hess, 317 U.S. 537, 545 (1943).
28. Id.
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case and obtaining a judgment on behalf of the Government.29 The Court
further found no statutory prohibition on opportunistic qui tam claims.30
This ruling so infuriated the Government that Attorney General
Francis Biddle urged Congress to repeal the qui tam provision of the Act.31
While the House did vote to repeal, the Senate instead moved to amend.32
The Senate placed a jurisdictional bar that only allowed qui tam actions
where the relator was the original source of the information.33 The
Amendment also limited the relator’s share.34 In a qui tam action where the
Government intervened,35 the relator could be awarded up to 10% by the
court or up to 25% if the Government did not intervene and the relator
proceeded on his own.36 While this Amendment eliminated opportunistic
lawsuits, the limit on relator’s share weakened the incentive for
well-meaning relators to disclose fraud.
As government spending dramatically expanded, Congress saw the
need to increase whistleblower incentives. The 1943 amendments went too
far and the FCA fell into disuse.37 Congress reduced the possible recoveries
for whistleblowers but had not yet codified protections for relators facing
retaliation.38 Whistleblowers who attempted to assist the government risked
losing their jobs once employers learned of their actions.39 Amid this risk,
relators had to wait as the DOJ conducted its investigation and only stood
to receive 10% of the recovery if the DOJ did intervene.40 Addressing these

29. Id.
30. Id. at 547–48.
31. S. REP. NO. 99-345, at 11, as reprinted in 1986 U.S.C.C.A.N. at 5276.
32. Id., as reprinted in 1986 U.S.C.C.A.N. at 5276.
33. Act of Dec. 23, 1943, ch. 377, 57 Stat. 608 (codified as amended at 31 U.S.C. § 232
(1976)).
34. Id. at 609.
35. See discussion infra Section I.C.2.
36. Act of Dec. 23, 1943, 57 Stat. at 609.
37. See Michael Lawrence Kolis, Comment, Settling for Less: The Department of
Justice’s Command Performance Under the 1986 False Claims Amendments Act, 7 ADMIN.
L.J. AM. U. 409, 416 (1993).
38. Id.
39. Id. (citing False Claims Reform Act: Hearing on S. 1562 Before the Subcomm. on
Admin. Practice & Procedure of the S. Comm. on the Judiciary, 99th Cong. 2, 49–51 (1985)
[hereinafter Hearing on S. 1562] (statement of qui tam relator John M. Gravitt)). For a more
thorough discussion of the hurdles faced by qui tam relators, like Mr. Gravitt, prior to the
1986 amendments, see James B. Helmer, Jr. & Robert Clark Neff, Jr., War Stories: A History
of the Qui Tam Provisions of the False Claims Act, the 1986 Amendments to the False Claims
Act, and Their Application in the United States ex rel. Gravitt v. General Electric Co.
Litigation, 18 OHIO N.U. L. REV. 35, 40–44 (1991).
40. Kolis, supra note 37, at 417–19.
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flaws, Senator Chuck Grassley stated that the FCA was “rooted in the
realization that we cannot guard against Government fraud without the aid
of private citizen informers . . . [but] the act’s incentive and utility for
private citizens was removed,” with the 1943 Amendment.41
Spearheaded by the efforts of Senator Grassley, Congress sought to
rectify these issues.42 The 1986 Amendment of the FCA increased the civil
penalties to as much as $10,000 per claim,43 which had been left at $2,000
since the Civil War.44 It also increased the damages from double the fraud
amount to triple.45 The relator’s share was also increased, bringing it to
levels still in place today.46 Additionally, the Amendment went beyond
mere monetary incentives. It created important protections for would-be
whistleblowers. First, the Amendment directed that all qui tam actions are
filed under seal.47 While this measure was intended to prevent qui tam
filings from tipping off targets of criminal investigations,48 it also provided
relators with a period of anonymity. While the Government conducted its
investigation, the defendant was not served with the lawsuit and, thus,
would not know if an employee had become a whistleblower.49 Perhaps the
most important whistleblower protection added by the 1986 Amendment
was 31 U.S.C. § 3730(h). This part of the Act created an individual cause
of action—commonly referred to as an “h-claim”—allowing
whistleblowers to recover for workplace retaliation that resulted from their
efforts assisting the government.50
During debates over the 1986 amendment to the FCA, Representative
Berman stated that despite the passage of time, the purpose of the FCA had
remained the same since its inception: “The U.S. taxpayers are being billed,
and we need all the resources we can obtain to address the problem.”51 The
1986 Amendment was a massive step toward ensuring that whistleblowers
41. Hearing on S. 1562, supra note 39, at 2 (alteration in original) (statement of Sen.
Chuck Grassley).
42. See id. at 1–3 (statement of Sen. Chuck Grassley).
43. 31 U.S.C. § 3729(a) (2012).
44. Hearing on S. 1562, supra note 39, at 3 (statement of Sen. Chuck Grassley).
45. § 3729(a) (1988).
46. 31 U.S.C. § 3730(d) (2012).
47. § 3730(b)(2).
48. S. REP. NO. 99-345, at 16 (1986), as reprinted in 1986 U.S.C.C.A.N. 5266, 5281
(“First, in response to Justice Department concerns that qui tam complaints filed in open
court might tip off targets of ongoing criminal investigations, the subcommittee adopted a
60-day seal provision for all qui tam complaints.”).
49. See § 3730(b)(2) (“The complaint shall be filed in camera, shall remain under seal
for at least 60 days, and shall not be served on the defendant until the court so orders.”).
50. § 3730(h).
51. 132 CONG. REC. 22,339 (1986).
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are properly incentivized to assist the government’s efforts in combatting
fraud. With the large increase in public spending brought on by the
pandemic, it is more important than ever to foster the partnership between
the government and qui tam whistleblowers. Despite the laudable efforts of
the 1986 Congress, all FCA actors—including Congress, the DOJ, the
courts, and the relators’ bar—must continue to strive to ensure that this
critical fraud fighting tool operates at peak efficacy.
C. How the Act Functions Today
Given the FCA’s storied development, a brief overview of how this act
functions today is warranted. Section I.C of this Article will outline (1) how
modern-day whistleblowers initiate a qui tam action on behalf of the
Government; (2) how the Government becomes involved—or declines
involvement—in whistleblowers’ suits; and (3) how the interplay between
various whistleblower statutes across our federal and state governments.
1. Filing a qui tam Action
Like all lawsuits, qui tam actions are initiated with the filing of a
complaint.52 However, these complaints are unique. Under the FCA, the
complaint is filed in camera and under seal.53 It is not a public document
and does not need to be served on the defendant.54 The only parties that
have access to these sealed documents are the relator, the court, and the
DOJ.55 The seal period lasts for sixty days and the Government may—and
typically does—request the court to extend the seal during its
investigation.56 These successive seal periods mean that a qui tam

52. FED. R. CIV. P. 3.
53. § 3730(b)(2).
54. Id.
55. Id.
56. § 3730(b)(2)–(3). Congress envisioned the initial sixty-day seal period as a wholly
sufficient timeframe for the Government to investigate the claim and make its intervention
decision. See S. REP. NO. 99-345, at 24–25 (1986), as reprinted in 1986 U.S.C.C.A.N. at
5289–90. This vision is clear in the FCA’s text, which notes that the seal period may only
be extended on a motion by the Government and “for good cause shown.” § 3730(b)(3).
However, in practice, courts routinely extend the seal period for years on end as the
Government investigates. See, e.g., Joel D. Hesch, It Takes Time: The Need to Extend the
Seal Period for Qui Tam Complaints Filed Under the False Claims Act, 38 SEATTLE U. L.
REV. 901, 903 (2015) (“In reality, it often takes between three and six years for the
Government to properly investigate and bring a complex fraud case that satisfies Rule 9(b)
and fulfills the duty to conduct a parallel criminal investigation without prematurely or
wrongfully accusing a company of defrauding the government.”).
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complaint can stay under seal for years before a defendant even becomes
aware that it has been sued.
Qui tam actions also require a second, unique initiating document.
Under the FCA, the relator is required to provide the Government with a
“written disclosure of substantially all material evidence and information”
in the relator’s possession.57 This is commonly referred to as the “disclosure
statement.” The disclosure statement provides the Government “with
enough information on alleged fraud to be able to make a well-reasoned
decision on whether it should participate in the filed lawsuit or allow the
relator to proceed alone.”58 There is minimal case law on the specific
requirements of this disclosure.59 This is likely due to the confidential
nature of the disclosure statement.60 Some courts have held that the
disclosure statement should only contain a recitation of facts,61 while other
courts have required more complex disclosures, including analysis,
argument, and opinion.62 Regardless of the complexity of a disclosure
statement, this unique document highlights the important partnership

57. § 3730(b)(2).
58. United States ex rel. Woodard v. Country View Care Ctr., Inc., 797 F.2d 888, 892
(10th Cir. 1986) (alteration in original) (construing § 3730(b) prior to its amendment in
1986).
59. See, e.g., United States ex rel. Bagley v. TRW Inc., 212 F.R.D. 554, 555 (C.D. Cal.
2003) (“Few reported decisions construe the nature and extent of the relator’s disclosure
obligation under section 3730(b)(2).”); United States ex rel. Made in the USA Found. v.
Billington, 985 F. Supp. 604, 608 (D. Md. 1997) (noting that “scant authority exists
delineating what constitutes” a legally sufficient disclosure statement).
60. See Bagley, 212 F.R.D. at 556. (ruling that the disclosure statement was protected
as work product); see also Miller v. Holzmann, 240 F.R.D. 20, 22 (2007) (ruling that
attorney–client privilege was not waived when the disclosure was submitted to the
Government as required by statute).
61. See, e.g., United States ex rel. O’Keefe v. McDonnell Douglas Corp., 918 F. Supp.
1338, 1346 (E.D. Mo. 1996) (“The written disclosure should simply contain all the relevant
factual information in [the relator’s] possession at the time he filed suit.”); United States ex
rel. Burns v. A.D. Roe Co., 904 F. Supp. 592, 594 (W.D. Ky. 1995) (stating that a disclosure
statement “is simply a recitation of factual information”); United States ex rel. Robinson v.
Northrop Corp., 824 F. Supp. 830, 838 (N.D. Ill. 1993) (stating that the disclosure obligation
“requires only a statement of facts,” and “should not contain opinions of an attorney”);
United States ex rel. Stone v. Rockwell Int’l Corp., 144 F.R.D. 396, 399 (D. Colo. 1992)
(stating that a written disclosure statement “contains nothing more than the evidence and
information which must come to light in any event once the case proceeds”).
62. See, e.g., Made in the USA Found., 985 F. Supp. at 608 (stating that a disclosure
statement “should, at a minimum, ‘comprise much of what [the relator] will rely upon to
support the contentions in the case at bar’”) (citation omitted); Grand ex rel. United States
v. Northrop Corp., 811 F. Supp. 333, 337 (S.D. Ohio 1992) (acknowledging that a disclosure
statement may contain legal analysis and opinion in addition to facts).
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between the government and qui tam relators. Both need to work in tandem
to build a strong claim and safeguard public assets from fraud.
2. Government Intervention
A watershed moment in all qui tam litigation is the Government’s
decision to intervene. When a whistleblower files an FCA action, the
Government may elect to intervene and take primary responsibility for
prosecuting the action.63 Government intervention provides a relator
significant advantages during the remainder of the litigation process. Over
95% of all FCA cases where the Government intervenes are successful,
while only 5% succeed if the Government elects not to intervene.64
If the Government intervenes many litigation decisions—like whether
to settle, dismiss, or litigate the case—are largely controlled by the
Government.65 This is because the whistleblower is asserting the
Government’s right to recover. This Government involvement is not a
detriment to the whistleblower, and in fact, it is often beneficial. After
intervention, the whistleblower has the full weight of the DOJ on their side.
This is a valuable resource. For example, the cost of the litigation is largely
shouldered by the Government, not the whistleblower.66 Importantly, the
DOJ can fund and carry out a pretrial investigation that far exceeds any that
could be conducted by a whistleblower’s private attorneys, building a
stronger case and boosting the likelihood of recovery.
Unlike other civil actions, a whistleblower cannot unilaterally decide
to accept a settlement offer from the defendant. The decision to settle is
entirely up to the Government.67 The Government may even agree to settle
the case over the objection of the whistleblower.68
However,
whistleblowers are not wholly unprotected from insufficient settlement

63. 31 U.S.C. § 3730(b)(2), (c)(1) (2012).
64. Hesch, supra note 56, at 902.
65. § 3730(c)(1) (“If the Government proceeds with the action, it shall have the primary
responsibility for prosecuting the action, and shall not be bound by an act of the person
bringing the action.”); § 3730(c)(2)(A) (“The Government may dismiss the action
notwithstanding the objections of the person initiating the action if the person has been
notified by the Government of the filing of the motion and the court has provided the person
with an opportunity for a hearing on the motion.”); § 3730(c)(2)(B) (“The Government may
settle the action with the defendant notwithstanding the objections of the person initiating
the action if the court determines, after a hearing, that the proposed settlement is fair,
adequate, and reasonable under all the circumstances.”).
66. But see § 3730(f) (stating that the Government is not liable for the whistleblower’s
expenses).
67. § 3730(c)(2)(B).
68. Id.
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amounts. The amount of the settlement must be deemed by the court as
“fair, adequate, and reasonable under all the circumstances.”69
If the Government declines to intervene, a whistleblower may elect to
continue the action on their own with private counsel.70 Even so, the
whistleblower may be required to keep the Government in the loop. If the
Government requests, the whistleblower must provide copies of all court
documents.71 As litigation continues, the Government has the right to
intervene at any time.72 While relators may continue litigation without
intervention, they lack the resources afforded in an intervened case.
Government intervention is often critical to a successful qui tam
action. While relators may still prevail if they proceed with litigation on
their own, the Government–whistleblower partnership is the best path to
combat fraud. The government needs whistleblowers to reveal otherwise
undiscovered fraud, and whistleblowers benefit greatly from an alliance
during complex litigation. For these reasons, the government—including
Congress, the courts, and the DOJ—should be cautious of policies that
hinder this critical partnership between whistleblowers and government
prosecutors. Strengthening this partnership is even more important in eras
of increased public spending, as we are experiencing today.
3. State and Federal Laws
While this Article is primarily focused on the federal FCA, many states
also have false claims acts with qui tam provisions.73 Identifying all
applicable statutes is critical for whistleblowers seeking to maximize their
recovery of public assets. In practice, a whistleblower may file under
multiple acts depending on how many governments were defrauded.74 If
the federal government was defrauded, then the whistleblower must proceed
under the federal FCA.75 If a state government was defrauded, the
whistleblower will need to file under the false claims act of that state.

69. Id.
70. § 3730(c)(3).
71. Id.
72. Id.
73. See, e.g., N.C. GEN. STAT. § 1-605 (2019).
74. Compare 31 U.S.C. § 3729(a) (2012) (stating that a defendant is liable to the federal
government for fraud against the United States), with N.C. GEN. STAT. § 1-605(b) (stating
that the purpose of the North Carolina False Claims Act is “to deter persons from knowingly
causing or assisting in causing the State to pay claims that are false or fraudulent and to
provide remedies in the form of treble damages and civil penalties when money is obtained
from the State by reason of a false or fraudulent claim”).
75. § 3729.
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Many fraud schemes impact multiple levels of government. For
example, Medicaid is made up of both federal and state funds.76 Therefore,
Medicaid whistleblowers can file under both the federal and state acts,
naming both governments as plaintiffs. Furthermore, fraud may span
multiple states, in which case a whistleblower may name multiple
governments and invoke multiple state acts in their complaint.
While many states have some kind of false claims act, not all have qui
tam provisions.77 A whistleblower is only allowed to sue on behalf of a
government that has expressly authorized it with a qui tam provision.78
Furthermore, some state laws are limited to specific types of fraud, such as
Medicaid fraud.79 To encourage enforcement and uniformity, the federal
government offers states an additional 10% share of any joint recovery if
their laws contain qui tam provisions and calculate damages similarly to the
federal FCA.80 The Office of Inspector General (OIG) has approved
twenty-one such state laws.81 A chart of these states is listed below.82 Not
only can a whistleblower pursue actions under both state and federal law,
these actions can generally be filed in either state or federal court.83 In
addition to state false claims acts, some municipalities have even passed

76. The Medicaid program was established by Title XIX of the Social Security Act,
Social Security Amendment Act of 1965, Pub. L. No. 89-97, sec. 121, 79 Stat. 286, 343
(codified as amended at 42 U.S.C. §§ 1396–1396v), as a cooperative program where the
federal government pays a percentage of the costs a state incurs for the medical care of
individuals who cannot afford to pay their own costs. Although states are not required to
provide Medicaid assistance, all fifty states currently do. For example, North Carolina
participates in the federal Medicaid program, and the North Carolina Department of Health
and Human Services (NC DHHS) administers the program throughout the state in
accordance with Title XIX of the Social Security Act. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 108A-54 (2019).
77. See chart infra p. 285.
78. As the Government is the party actually harmed by the fraud, a relator only has
standing to bring an FCA action because the Government has assigned the relator its right to
sue under the qui tam provision. Vt. Agency of Nat. Res v. United Stated ex rel. Stevens,
529 U.S. 765, 773–74 (2000).
79. See, e.g., Tennessee Medicaid False Claims Act, TENN. CODE ANN. § 71-5-181
(2019).
80. See Deficit Reduction Act of 2005, Pub. L. No. 109–171, sec. 6031, 120 Stat. 72
(codified as amended at 42 U.S.C. § 1396h); Publication of OIG’s Guidelines for Evaluating
State False Claims Acts, 71 Fed. Reg. 48,552 (Aug. 21, 2006).
81. State False Claims Act Reviews, U.S. DEP’T OF HEALTH & HUM. SERVS., OFF. OF
INSPECTOR GEN. https://oig.hhs.gov/fraud/state-false-claims-act-reviews/ [https://perma.cc/
G4MJ-RBXR].
82. Id.
83. See, e.g., Soni v. Boston Med. Ctr. Corp., 683 F. Supp. 2d 74, 87–91 (D. Mass. 2009)
(finding that state courts have concurrent jurisdiction with federal courts to hear actions
under the federal FCA).

https://scholarship.law.campbell.edu/clr/vol43/iss3/2

12

Bell and Miller: Fraud in the Pandemic: How COVID-19 Affects <em>Qui Tam</em> Whis

2021]

FRAUD IN THE PANDEMIC

285

their own acts.84 This proliferation of false claims acts shows the need for
whistleblowers to assist in protecting public investments across all levels of
government. As government spending increases across all levels of
government to address the public health crisis of the pandemic,
governments with false claims acts should look to strengthen these laws.
Moreover, states and municipalities without these laws should make every
effort to enact meaningful legislation to avert fraud on public assets.
State Laws Approved by the Office of Inspector General
California
Colorado
Connecticut
Delaware
Georgia
Hawaii
Illinois

Indiana
Iowa
Massachusetts
Montana
Nevada
New York
North Carolina

Oklahoma
Rhode Island
Tennessee
Texas
Vermont
Virginia
Washington

State Laws Considered Insufficient by the
Office of Inspector General
Florida
Louisiana

Michigan
Minnesota

New Hampshire
New Jersey

New Mexico
Wisconsin

II. IMPORTANT LEGAL DOCTRINES
The FCA’s qui tam practice is a complex area of federal litigation.
Many of the doctrines in this area of law are well beyond the purview of
this Article. Therefore, this Part will merely address areas ripe for change
and those that are likely to have a direct impact on whistleblowers working
to combat fraud in this pandemic, including (1) the FCA’s materiality
requirement; (2) the Government’s dismissal authority; (3) the FCA’s
original source rule; and (4) the FCA’s scienter requirement.

84. See, e.g., N.Y.C. ADMIN. CODE § 7-801 to -810 (2012); S. F. ADMIN. CODE. § 6.80–
.83 (1999); CHI., ILL., MUN. CODE § 1-21-010 (2005).
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A. Materiality
The FCA requires that the alleged fraud was material to the
government’s payment decision.85 That materiality requirement asks
whether the government’s decision to pay was actually affected by the
fraud. The Act defines material as “having a natural tendency to influence,
or be capable of influencing, the payment or receipt of money or
property.”86 While this definition offers little clarity, the Supreme Court
recently rendered a decision that dealt extensively with materiality.87
In Escobar, the Supreme Court warns that materiality does not exist
where noncompliance is minor.88 Therefore, potential whistleblowers
should be wary if the fraud is based on a mere technicality. “[M]ateriality
‘looks to the effect on the likely or actual behavior of the recipient of the
alleged misrepresentation.’”89 The mere fact that the government identifies
a regulation as a condition for payment does not necessarily make a
misrepresentation material, nor does the fact that the government has the
option of refusing payment.90 “What matters is not the label the
Government attaches to a requirement, but whether the defendant
knowingly violated a requirement that the defendant knows is material to
the Government’s payment decision.”91 Materiality can be shown with
evidence that the government often refuses to pay claims involving similar
non-compliance.92 Contrarily, if the government often pays similar claims
with full knowledge that a requirement is lacking, those claims likely are
not material.93
The Supreme Court ends its discussion in Escobar with a final
warning: “The standard for materiality that we have outlined is a familiar
and rigorous one.”94 Despite the Court’s proclamation that materiality is a
85. United States ex rel. Harrison v. Westinghouse Savannah River Co. (Harrison II),
352 F.3d 908, 913 (4th Cir. 2003) (listing the elements of an FCA claim as “(1) that the
defendant made a false statement or engaged in a fraudulent course of conduct; (2) such
statement or conduct was made or carried out with the requisite scienter; (3) the statement
or conduct was material; and (4) the statement or conduct caused the government to pay out
money or to forfeit money due”).
86. 31 U.S.C. § 3729(b)(4) (2012).
87. See Universal Health Servs., Inc. v. United States ex rel. Escobar, 136 S. Ct. 1989
(2016).
88. Id. at 2003 (citing United States ex rel. Marcus v. Hess, 317 U.S. 537, 543 (1943)).
89. Id. at 2002 (alterations omitted).
90. Id. at 2003.
91. Id. at 1996.
92. Id.
93. Id. at 2003–04.
94. Id. at 2004 n.6.
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“familiar” standard, many observers have noted that Escobar did little to
clarify the standard.95 In fact, Senator Grassley recently hinted that
proposed legislation may be in the works to clarify this standard.96
Congress has long struggled with codifying ideal incentives to ensure
whistleblowers are willing to bringing evidence of fraud to light.97 At the
onset, the FCA’s materiality requirement appeared straightforward, merely
requiring that the defendant’s conduct had the ability to influence the
government’s payment decision.98 As with many things, this apparently
clear statutory definition has resulted in mired case law. In order to ensure
that whistleblowers are incentivized by the FCA, Congress must clarify this
requirement. When whistleblowers weigh the risk of reporting fraud, they
should have the assurance of clear statutory requirements in evaluating their
cases.
B. The Government’s Authority to Dismiss: The Granston Memo
As previously noted, the government has wide latitude under the FCA
to control actions brought by qui tam relators.99 The DOJ’s control over qui
tam matters even includes the ability to dismiss an action over the objections
of the relator.100 In January 2018, Michael D. Granston, Director of the
Commercial Litigation Branch at the DOJ, sent a letter to all DOJ attorneys
working on FCA cases.101 The so called “Granston Memo” urged the
Government’s attorneys to more aggressively employ their dismissal power
in FCA cases.102 The memo cited the need to conserve government
resources, noting an exponential rise in qui tam filings.103

95. See Jacob J. Stephens, Dicta Me This: Implied False Certification to Materiality
Under the False Claims Act Post-Escobar, 44 U. DAYTON L. REV. 273, 291 (2019) (“Legal
scholars and professionals alike view the Escobar decision as a definitive endorsement of
implied false certification. These same individuals, however, have expressed concerns that
the Supreme Court has left the materiality standard at least as clouded as it was before the
landmark decision.”).
96. See generally Grassley, supra note 6.
97. See discussion supra Section I.B.
98. See 31 U.S.C. § 3729(b)(4) (2012) (defining materiality).
99. See discussion supra Section I.C.2.
100. 31 U.S.C. § 3730(c)(2)(A) (2012) (“The Government may dismiss the action
notwithstanding the objections of the person initiating the action if the person has been
notified by the Government of the filing of the motion and the court has provided the person
with an opportunity for a hearing on the motion.”).
101. Memorandum from Michael D. Granston, Dir., Com. Litig. Branch, Fraud Section,
to Att’ys in the Com. Litig. Branch, Fraud Section (Jan. 10, 2018) (on file with author).
102. Id. at 1.
103. Id.
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Prior to the Granston Memo, the DOJ’s dismissal power was rarely
exercised.104 However, within two years of this directive, the DOJ moved
to dismiss as many as forty-five qui tam actions.105 Moreover, courts began
to allow these dismissals with great deference to the DOJ.106 While the
circuits have established two divergent tests for the DOJ’s dismissal
authority, neither offers qui tam relators much protection. The FCA states
that the DOJ may dismiss an action over the objections of a relator, as long
as the relator is notified of the Government’s motion to dismiss and afforded
a hearing.107 Under one approach, the Swift standard, the Government is
given “an unfettered right to dismiss an action.”108 This highly deferential
test may lead some to ask: Why would Congress require a hearing on
dismissal if a court cannot overrule the government’s motion?109 While the
second approach employed by the circuits is less deferential to the DOJ, it
also does little to protect relators from overzealous dismissals. The Sequoia
test allows for dismissal as long as there is a “rational relation” between the
Government’s dismissal decision and a government interest.110
Since the issuance of the Granston Memo, the DOJ has continued to
argue in favor of an unfettered right to dismiss under Swift.111 This push
has been met with backlash. Notably, among the dissenters is Senator
Grassley, who wrote a letter to United States Attorney General Barr
imploring the DOJ to change its stance.112 Senator Grassley argues that the
DOJ’s interpretation ignores the plain meaning of the hearing requirement

104. Letter from Sen. Chuck Grassley to Att’y Gen. William Barr, supra note 4, at 2.
105. Id. While forty-five dismissed actions over two years may not seem substantial, this
is a meaningful number of actions. For illustration, the DOJ reports that only 633 qui tam
actions were filed in 2019. Press Release, Off. of Pub. Affs., U.S. Dep’t of Just., Justice
Department Recovers over $3 Billion from False Claims Act Cases in Fiscal Year 2019 (Jan.
9, 2020), https://www.justice.gov/opa/pr/justice-department-recovers-over-3-billion-falseclaims-act-cases-fiscal-year-2019 [https://perma.cc/79CH-LXEM].
106. See infra notes 108–10 and accompanying text.
107. 31 U.S.C. § 3730(c)(2)(A) (2012).
108. Swift v. United States, 318 F.3d 250, 252 (D.C. Cir. 2003).
109. The D.C. Circuit answers this question, characterizing the purpose of this statutorily
required hearing as “simply to give the relator a formal opportunity to convince the
government not to end the case.” Id. at 253.
110. United States ex rel. Sequoia Orange Co. v. Baird-Neece Packing Corp., 151 F.3d
1139, 1145 (9th Cir. 1998).
111. See, e.g., Letter from Sen. Chuck Grassley to Att’y Gen. William Barr, supra note
4, at 1 (noting a brief to the Supreme Court filed by the United States Solicitor General Noel
J. Francisco, arguing that the Court adopt the Swift test).
112. Id.
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and is contrary to Congressional intent.113 Rebutting the Granston Memo’s
focus on preserving government resources as a justification for dismissals,
Senator Grassley warns that “unfettered dismissal authority will create a
chilling effect on future whistleblowers that will ultimately end up costing
the taxpayers a lot more.”114
The recent rise in DOJ dismissals, bolstered by deferential courts,
poses a true threat to the success of the FCA. Again, the success of this
partnership between the government and private whistleblowers is proven,
having recovered nearly $60 billion since its 1986 amendment.115 While
the DOJ certainly must expend resources in the process, the FCA’s benefit
to the American taxpayer clearly outweighs the cost. If the DOJ wishes to
protect government resources, it should focus on strengthening the FCA,
rather than hampering it. Even in cases where DOJ attorneys fear expending
more resources than may be recovered, they have the option of allowing the
relators to proceed with their actions without Government intervention.116
Erring on the side of non-intervention, rather than overzealous dismissal,
leaves open the potential for a Government recovery while still conserving
DOJ resources.117 As with any period of increased government spending,
amid the current pandemic, the government should focus its efforts on
encouraging whistleblowers to assist in protecting public resources.
C. The Original Source Rule
A whistleblower must be the original source of the information in order
to bring a lawsuit under the FCA.118 To qualify as the original source, the
whistleblower’s information must not have been publicly disclosed.119
Information is deemed publicly disclosed if it is the subject matter of a civil

113. Id. at 2–3. In arguing that the Swift test contradicts Congressional intent, Senator
Grassley also notes that he was the author of the 1986 amendment to the FCA. Id. at 1.
114. Id. at 6. It is notable that Senator Grassley felt the need to hand underline this point,
before ending the letter with a handwritten note to Attorney General Barr. Id.
115. Id. at 1.
116. 31 U.S.C. § 3730(b)(4)(B) (2012).
117. Cf. United States ex rel. Marcus v. Hess, 317 U.S. 537, 545 (1943) (noting that even
opportunistic qui tam suits can benefit the government where the relator expends his own
resources to obtain a recovery for the government). The argument that the DOJ should allow
relators to proceed on their own, rather than dismissing the case, should not be taken as an
argument against Government intervention. Ideally, the Government should intervene in
any meritorious qui tam action where the Government stands to net a recovery, due to the
increased likelihood of success in intervened cases. See Hesch, supra note 56, at 902.
118. § 3730(e)(4)(A).
119. Id.
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or criminal trial; a congressional report, hearing, audit, or investigation; or
in the news.120
In some instances, a whistleblower may still be the original source
even if there has been a public disclosure. For example, if the whistleblower
brought an FCA suit and disclosed the information to the government before
the public disclosure, he is still the original source.121 A whistleblower may
also become the original source if their information “is independent of and
materially adds to the publicly disclosed allegations.”122
During the pandemic, the original source rule will likely become an
issue in areas where the government has already initiated investigations into
possible fraud, and such allegations become public.123 While the original
source rule was intended to prevent opportunistic qui tam actions,124 it
should not be used to hamper the efforts of well-meaning whistleblowers
who bring necessary support to a government investigation. As the
government continues its efforts to prevent fraud during the COVID-19
recovery, it must rely on whistleblowers to uncover fraud.
D. Scienter
Lawsuits under the FCA require that the defendant have sufficient
culpability. This is known as the scienter requirement. Simply put, there
must be evidence that the defendant “knowingly” defrauded the
government.125 The Act’s scienter requirement is clarified in § 3729, which
provides three definitions of “knowingly.”126 Scienter is met if the
defendant “(i) has actual knowledge of the information; (ii) acts in
deliberate ignorance of the truth or falsity of the information; or (iii) acts in
reckless disregard of the truth or falsity of the information.”127
While the Act does require some knowledge of the fraudulent nature
of the defendant’s actions, there is no intent requirement. In fact, the
definition of “knowingly” expressly states that the term “require[s] no proof
of specific intent to defraud.”128 “The purpose of the FCA’s scienter

120.
121.
122.
123.
124.
125.
126.
127.
128.

Id.
§ 3730(e)(4)(B).
Id.
See discussion infra Section IV.A.
See supra text accompanying notes 26–36.
31 U.S.C. § 3729(a) (2012).
§ 3729(b)(1)(A).
Id.
§ 3729(b)(1)(B).
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requirement is to avoid punishing ‘honest mistakes or incorrect claims
submitted through mere negligence.’”129
Scienter can be proven in many ways. In many of the cases brought
by the authors of this Article, scienter is shown when the relator raises
concerns of possible fraud to the defendant or one of its officers, and those
concerns are ignored or dismissed, and the defendant continues with its
wrongful conduct. Even better proof has been found in emails or recorded
conversations in which the defendant or one of its officers admits actual
knowledge of the fraud. Often, scienter is one of the most difficult hurdles
in the FCA and largely depends on the documentation collected and
disclosed by the whistleblower.
In the context of pandemic fraud, scienter evidence will be critical to
show that that fraudsters were not simply making “honest mistakes”130 when
submitting their false claims. Many defendants may claim that they
incorrectly, but honestly, believed they qualified for COVID-19 relief plans,
which were being rushed into action with ever-changing regulatory
guidance.131 Also, the often-critical nature of scienter evidence may provide
pandemic whistleblowers an opportunity to overcome an original source
hurdle. Even if the Government has initiated an investigation and the
allegations are public, an inside whistleblower with significant scienter
evidence may materially add to the Government’s investigation.132
III. COMMON FRAUD SCHEMES
A. Medicare and Medicaid Fraud
Medicare and Medicaid fraud are the largest types of fraud combatted
by the FCA. Each year, the government spends nearly $1 trillion on these
government healthcare programs.133 According to the Centers for Medicare
129. United States ex rel. Drakeford v. Tuomey, 792 F.3d 364, 380 (4th Cir. 2015)
(quoting United States ex rel. Owens v. First Kuwaiti Gen. Trading & Contracting Co., 612
F.3d 724, 728 (4th Cir. 2010)).
130. Id.
131. See discussion infra Section IV.A.
132. 31 U.S.C. § 3730(e)(4)(B) (2012).
133. Thomas Reilly, The Extrapolation Conundrum: Finding a Unified Theory for the
Use of Statistical Sampling in Medicare Fraud Cases Brought Under the False Claims Act,
47 SETON HALL L. REV. 1103 (2017). While this Article will refer to government healthcare
fraud in terms of Medicare and Medicaid, other programs are often also implicated in FCA
cases. See, e.g., 10 U.S.C. §§ 1071–1110b (2012) (establishing the TRICARE program,
which provides healthcare to uniform service members, their families, and their survivors,
functioning similarly to Medicare).
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and Medicaid Services (CMS), $45.8 billion was improperly billed between
July 2012 and June 2013.134 This represents nearly 13% of all billing during
that timeframe.135 Given the sheer size of these programs and the breadth
of the healthcare industry as a whole, Medicare and Medicaid fraud can take
many forms. The various fraud schemes discussed below are just some of
the more common schemes combated by the FCA and its whistleblowers.
Much of the fraud perpetrated on government healthcare is in the form
of improper coding and services billing. CMS is a United States agency
responsible for administering the Medicare and Medicaid programs, under
which healthcare facilities and providers may be reimbursed with federal
funds for services provided to eligible patients.136 In addition to regulations,
CMS issues sub-regulatory guidance to address policy issues as well as
operational updates and technical clarifications of existing guidance. Bills
are submitted to government healthcare programs as medical codes,
designating the specific service rendered.137 Specifically, healthcare
providers submit Current Procedural Terminology (CPT) codes, as
promulgated by the American Medical Association.138 Unfortunately, due
to the size of these government programs, fee-for-service providers are able
to submit claims to the government with little oversight.139 For the most
part, if a provider submits a reimbursable code with documentation that
appears to support that code, they will receive payment from the
government.140 Given the minimal oversight and relative ease of receiving
payment, fraudulent billing is rampant.

134. CTRS. FOR MEDICARE & MEDICAID SERVS., MEDICARE FEE-FOR-SERVICE 2014
IMPROPER PAYMENTS REPORT 1–2 (2014) https://www.cms.gov/Research-Statistics-Dataand-Systems/Monitoring-Programs/Medicare-FFS-Compliance-Programs/CERT/Downloa
ds/MedicareFeeforService2014ImproperPaymentsReport.pdf [https://perma.cc/6ZGN-44U
N].
135. Id.
136. See 42 U.S.C. § 1395 (2012).
137. See Medicare Billing: Form CMS-1450 and the 837 Institutional, CTRS. FOR
MEDICARE & MEDICAID SERVS. 4 (June 2018), https://www.cms.gov/Outreach-andEducation/Medicare-Learning-Network-MLN/MLNProducts/Downloads/837I-FormCMS1450-ICN006926.pdf [https://perma.cc/A2S5-P4DM].
138. Id. at 5.
139. Reilly, supra note 133 at 1104 (noting that codes are submitted on “an honor system”
with no “built-in checks and balances or due diligence” to guard against fraud) (citations
omitted).
140. Brooke Benzio, Fee-for-Disservice: Medicare Fraud in the Home Healthcare
Industry, 19 ANNALS HEALTH L. 229, 231 (2009).
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One way to fraudulently boost billing is a practice known as
“upcoding.”141 This means that the provider submitted a code to the
government claiming the service provided was more complex than the
service that was actually provided.142 The most clear cut examples of
upcoding occur in the context of Evaluation and Management (E/M)
codes.143 E/M codes provide five distinct codes for office visits for
established patients, escalated depending upon the complexity of service
rendered.144 At the low end, code 99211 provides reimbursement for
services where problems are “minimal” and typically only require five
minutes of care.145 On the high end, code 99215 requires at least two of the
following (1) a comprehensive history; (2) a comprehensive examination;
and (3) medical decision making of high complexity.146 Each one of these
elements requires various sub-elements to be properly billed.147 Given the
government’s reliance on the documents submitted by providers, less
scrupulous providers can easily submit inflated codes to receive higher
reimbursements than warranted.
A similar fraud scheme occurs in time-based billing. Many services
are billed in fifteen-minute increments called “units.”148 To increase
flexibility, CMS allows providers to bill within specified time ranges that
are intended to average out to fifteen-minute units.149 For example, services
lasting between eight and twenty-two minutes may be billed as one
fifteen-minute unit.150 These time ranges can be manipulated to defraud the
government. For example, two separate eight-minute sessions can be billed

141. See, e.g., United States v. Janati, 237 Fed. App’x 843, 846–47 (4th Cir. 2007)
(discussing a criminal conviction for healthcare fraud arising out of an upcoding scheme
perpetrated against Medicare and private insurance).
142. Id. at 845.
143. See id.; see also Medicare Billing: Form CMS-1450 and the 837 Institutional, supra
note 137, at 5.
144. See AMA, CPT 2020 PROFESSIONAL EDITION 12 (2019) [hereinafter CPT 2020]; see
also Janati, 237 Fed. App’x at 845.
145. CPT 2020, supra note 144, at 12–13; see also Janati, 237 Fed. App’x at 845.
146. CPT 2020, supra note 144, at 13; see also Janati, 237 Fed. App’x at 845.
147. See CPT® Evaluation and Management (E/M) Office or Other Outpatient (9920299215) and Prolonged Services (99354, 99355, 99356, 99XXX) Code and Guideline
Changes, AMA 7–8 (2019), https://www.ama-assn.org/system/files/2019-06/cpt-officeprolonged-svs-code-changes.pdf [https://perma.cc/77QW-KVZC].
148. Medicare Claims Processing Manual: Chapter 5 - Part B Outpatient Rehabilitation
and CORF/OPT Services, CTRS. FOR MEDICARE & MEDICAID SERVS. § 20.2(C),
https://www.cms.gov/Regulations-and-Guidance/Guidance/Manuals/Downloads/clm104c0
5.pdf [https://perma.cc/VCY4-Y3Y2].
149. Id.
150. Id.
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as two units, while a single sixteen-minute session can only be billed as one
unit. Similarly, providers may manipulate their service time to move into a
higher unit range and maximize billing. After all, a twenty-two-minute
session can be billed as just one unit, while just one extra minute of service
increases the bill to two units. While these ranges were intended to
encompass average service times of fifteen-minutes, they can easily be
abused.
Yet another potential source of fraud are claims submitted for services
that were not medically necessary. Medical necessity of a procedure is a
condition of payment under government healthcare programs.151 Therefore,
every time a provider submits a claim to the government for reimbursement,
there is an express or implied certification that the service was medically
necessary.152 If a service is rendered needlessly and billed to the
government, it is a false claim.
Other FCA enforcement actions in the healthcare field are related to
kickbacks and self-referrals. It is a violation of federal law to offer, pay, or
receive kickbacks for referrals in federally funded healthcare programs.153
This is known as the Anti-Kickback Statute. Kickbacks can include a wide
array of remuneration beyond simple cash bribes exchanged for referrals.
They encompass the purchase, lease, or provision of any goods or services
exchanged for referrals.154 Under another federal law, the Stark Law, it is
also a violation for a physician to refer a patient to a facility if the referring
physician has a financial relationship with that facility.155
Compliance with these laws is an express condition of payment under
Medicare and Medicaid programs.156 In their enrollment application to
federally funded programs, providers certify that they will comply with all
relevant laws, including the Anti-Kickback Statute and the Stark Law.157
151. Winter ex rel. United States v. Gardens Reg’l Hosp. & Med. Ctr., Inc. 953 F.3d
1108, 1114 (9th Cir. 2020).
152. Id.
153. 42 U.S.C. § 1320a-7b(b) (2019).
154. Id.
155. 42 U.S.C. § 1395nn(a)(1), (h)(6) (2012).
156. See United States ex rel. Thompson v. Columbia/HCA Healthcare Corp., 125 F.3d
899, 902 (5th Cir. 1997); see also United States ex rel. Hopper v. Anton, 91 F.3d 1261, 1266
(9th Cir. 1996).
157. Medicare Enrollment Application, CTRS. FOR MEDICARE & MEDICAID SERVS. (July
2011), https://www.cms.gov/Medicare/CMS-Forms/CMS-Forms/downloads/cms855a.pdf
[https://perma.cc/VA8B-N2ZK] (“I understand that payment of a claim by Medicare is
conditioned upon the claim and the underlying transaction complying with such laws,
regulations, and program instructions (including, but not limited to, the Federal
anti-kickback statute and the Stark law), and on the provider’s compliance with all applicable
conditions of participation in Medicare.”).
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Thus, healthcare providers who violate these laws can be liable under the
FCA to whistleblowers and the federal government if those kickbacks or
self-referrals resulted in payments from the government.
Despite the wide array of potential fraud schemes, all share one
common element—the government must rely on the submissions of
providers when making their payment decision. If fraudsters submit claims
that appear valid on their face, they will be successful in obtaining public
resources. Therefore, whistleblowers with inside knowledge of false claims
are critical to uncover fraud. Government spending on medical services is
a trillion-dollar annual endeavor, and that figure will only rise amid the
nationwide health crisis of the pandemic. Whistleblowers are more
necessary than ever to combat this widespread fraud.
B. Government Procurement and Contract Fraud
The FCA was originally aimed at curtailing fraud in government
contracts;158 that need is even more evident today as government spending
has grown exponentially since the initial passage of the FCA. The federal
government is one of the largest purchasers of goods and services in our
economy. For example, in 2017 the federal government obligated $507
billion for contracts.159 The pandemic has significantly increased that
expenditure. As of April 2021, the federal government incurred $39 billion
in new contracts specifically related to the pandemic.160 Given the vast
number of resources at issue, cases concerning fraud in government
contracts are some of the highest value cases under the FCA.161
The purchase of products by the federal government and its various
agencies are governed by a complex statutory scheme outlined in the
Federal Acquisition Regulations System, found in Title 48 of the Code of
Federal Regulations.162 This overarching regulatory regime is augmented

158. See discussion supra Section I.B.
159. MOSHE SCHWARTZ, ET AL., DEFENSE ACQUISITIONS: HOW AND WHERE DOD SPENDS
ITS CONTRACTING DOLLARS 2 (2018), https://fas.org/sgp/crs/natsec/R44010.pdf [https://per
ma.cc/MXQ2-SE5H].
160. COVID-19 Spending, supra note 5.
161. See, e.g., Press Release, Off. of Pub. Affs., U.S. Dep’t of Just., Three South Korean
Companies Agree to Plead Guilty and to Enter into Civil Settlements for Rigging Bids on
United States Department of Defense Fuel Supply Contracts (Nov. 14, 2018),
https://www.justice.gov/opa/pr/three-south-korean-companies-agree-plead-guilty-and-enter
-civil-settlements-rigging-bids [https://perma.cc/4F8Y-G34N] (announcing a $154 million
civil settlement involving the government’s purchase of gasoline abroad, which also
included criminal penalties bringing the total recovery to $236 million).
162. 48 C.F.R. § 1.000 (2016).
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by various agency supplements, including the Defense Federal Acquisition
Regulatory Supplement.163
Not only are sellers to the government prohibited from selling the
government worthless products,164 but these regulations ensure that the
government, as a market participant, receives a “fair and reasonable”
price.165 While no federal regulation mandates that private sellers give the
government their best price, “[t]he Government will seek to obtain the
offeror’s best price (the best price given to the most favored customer).”166
Based on this mandate for government employees to seek out the best price,
the contract officers rely on data provided by private sellers “necessary to
establish a fair and reasonable price.”167
“[A]t a minimum, the contracting officer shall obtain appropriate data,
without certification, on the prices at which the same or similar items have
previously been sold and determine if the data is adequate for evaluating the
reasonableness of the price.”168 “The Government may use various price
analysis techniques and procedures to ensure a fair and reasonable price.”169
These include (1) comparison of prices from multiple sellers, relying on
competition to ensure a fair and reasonable price;170 or (2) comparison of
prices previously paid by the government or private purchasers.171 While
relevant market conditions or the specific needs of a given transaction may
justify the government paying a higher price,172 the government requires
sufficient data to understand the disparity between its price and the best
commercially available price.173
Price representations by private sellers are critical in allowing contract
officers to do their due diligence, confirming that the government receives
163. 48 C.F.R. § 201.101 (1997).
164. See supra text accompanying notes 19–21.
165. See 48 C.F.R. § 15.402(a) (2012) (“Contracting officers shall . . . [p]urchase
supplies and services from responsible sources at fair and reasonable prices.”).
166. 48 C.F.R. § 538.270-1(c) (2002).
167. 48 C.F.R. § 15.402(a)(1).
168. 48 C.F.R. § 15.404-1(b)(1) (2020).
169. 48 C.F.R. § 15.404-1(b)(2).
170. Id. (“Comparison of proposed prices received in response to the solicitation.
Normally, adequate price competition establishes a fair and reasonable price . . . .”)
171. 48 C.F.R. § 15.404-1(b)(2)(ii) (2020) (“Comparison of the proposed prices to
historical prices paid, whether by the Government or other than the Government, for the
same or similar items. This method may be used for commercial items including those ‘of a
type’ or requiring minor modifications.”).
172. 48 C.F.R. § 538.270-1(e) (2002).
173. 48 C.F.R. § 538.270-1(e)(7) (2002) (“If the best price is not offered to the
Government, you should ask the offeror to identify and explain the reason for any
differences.”).
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a fair and reasonable price and justifying the government’s payment
decisions. As with other instances of fraud on government resources,
whistleblowers are often needed to uncover wrongdoing. With the immense
proliferation of government contracts during the pandemic, these
whistleblowers are more necessary than ever.
C. Grant and Loan Fraud
Fraud on government grants and loans are also combatted by the FCA.
As of April 2021, the federal government has become obligated to $245.2
billion in grants directly related to COVID-19.174 These grants are wide
ranging and include support for research, education, healthcare, and
transportation.175 The government has also dramatically increased its loan
programs amid the pandemic. As of April 2021, the government has
incurred $719.3 billion in loan obligations directly aimed at the
pandemic.176 Like other areas of government spending addressed above,
such large outlays of public assets will lead to fraud.
Grant fraud, like all fraud schemes addressed by the FCA, involves the
submission of false claims to the government for payment.177 False
statements can come in many forms, including misleading grant
applications, the submission of false data in connection with an ongoing
grant, or false statement of grant eligibility.178 While enforcement actions
against the most overt fraudsters have already begun,179 the government will

174. COVID-19 Spending, supra note 5.
175. Id. (listing various recipients of COVID-19 related grants).
176. Id. (discussing total loan award obligations to various recipients).
177. See 31 U.S.C. § 3729(a) (2012).
178. See, e.g., Press Release, Off. of Pub. Affs., U.S. Dep’t of Just., Duke University
Agrees to Pay U.S. $112.5 Million to Settle False Claims Act Allegations Related to
Scientific Research Misconduct (Mar. 25, 2019), https://www.justice.gov/opa/pr/dukeuniversity-agrees-pay-us-1125-million-settle-false-claims-act-allegations-related [https://pe
rma.cc/H36X-RW5L] (discussing a settlement where Duke University was alleged to have
“fabricated data or statements in thirty (30) grants,” inducing payment from the National
Institutes of Health and the Environmental Protection Agency); Press Release, Off. of Pub.
Affs., U.S. Dep’t of Just., Lakeway Regional Medical Center LLC and Co-Defendants Agree
to Pay Over $15.3 Million to Resolve Allegations They Fraudulently Obtained
Government-Insured Loan and Misused Loan Funds (Sept. 28, 2020), https://www.justice.go
v/opa/pr/lakeway-regional-medical-center-llc-and-co-defendants-agree-pay-over-153-milli
on-resolve [https://perma.cc/UY5S-NJ3Y] (discussing a settlement where a hospital
allegedly obtained a loan intended to build hospitals in underserved areas from the Federal
Housing Administration and Department of Housing and Urban Development by making
false statements on the loan application).
179. See discussion infra Section IV.A.
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need to rely on whistleblowers and the FCA to uncover more covert fraud
schemes if it wishes to preserve its public investment.
IV. IMPACT OF THE PANDEMIC
A. The Paycheck Protection Program
One of the largest COVID-19 recovery efforts by the federal
government came in the form of the CARES Act and its Paycheck
Protection Program (PPP). In response to the massive economic impact of
the virus and related shutdowns, Congress authorized $659 billion in
forgivable loans to small businesses.180 The loans given to struggling
businesses were intended to cover expenses like payroll, health benefits,
salaries, mortgage payments, rent, and utilities.181 Loan payments were
deferred,182 and borrowers are allowed to apply for loan forgiveness if the
funds are used for the intended purposes.183
In applying for the loans, borrowers make certain certifications of
eligibility.184 These certifications include (1) that economic uncertainty
makes the loan request necessary; (2) that the funds will be used for the
intended purposes listed above; (3) that the applicant does not have
duplicative loan applications; and (4) that the applicant has not already
received duplicative loans under the program.185
Abuse of this program quickly arose. First were reports of big
businesses obtaining PPP loans, including the Los Angeles Lakers and the
Ruth’s Chris Steak House chain.186 Next came reports that private banks—

180. CARES Act, Pub. L. No. 116–136, § 1102(b)(1), 134 Stat. 281, 286–93 (2020)
(providing initial funding of $349 billion); Paycheck Protection Program and Health Care
Enhancement Act (“CARES Act II”), Pub. L. No. 116–139, sec. 101(a)(1), 134 Stat. 620
(2020) (increasing funding to $659 billion).
181. CARES Act § 1102(a)(2)(F)(i)(I)–(VII).
182. CARES Act § 1102(a)(2)(M).
183. CARES Act § 1102(a)(2)(H).
184. CARES Act § 1102(a)(2)(G)(i)(I)–(IV).
185. Id.
186. Jim Zarroli, Even the Los Angeles Lakers Got a PPP Small Business Loan, NPR
(Apr. 27, 2020, 3:47 PM), https://www.npr.org/sections/coronavirus-live-updates/2020/04/2
7/846024717/even-the-la-lakers-got-a-ppp-small-business-loan [https://perma.cc/YTC9-A
A33]; Zachary Warmbrodt, SBA Presses Big Businesses to Justify Aid, Sparking Uproar,
POLITICO (Oct. 30, 2020, 7:00 PM), https://www.politico.com/news/2020/10/30/sba-bigbusinesses-ppp-loans-433736 [https://perma.cc/F2BP-FASW].

https://scholarship.law.campbell.edu/clr/vol43/iss3/2

26

Bell and Miller: Fraud in the Pandemic: How COVID-19 Affects <em>Qui Tam</em> Whis

2021]

FRAUD IN THE PANDEMIC

299

who were used to process PPP loans—were prioritizing wealthy, existing
clients over small businesses that were truly in need.187
Then came the fraud. The DOJ announced its first criminal charges
related to fraudulent PPP applications on May 5, 2020.188 Since those initial
charges, the DOJ has charged sixty-five defendants in fifty separate cases
for allegedly defrauding the PPP.189 These initial cases represent the most
overt instances of PPP fraud. For instance, many of the charged PPP
recipients allegedly used loan proceeds on lavish expenditures, including
multiple instances where separate recipients purchased Lamborghinis.190
Also, many of these early cases involve purely fictitious businesses, where
recipients allegedly claimed payroll expenses for nonexistent companies. 191
These cases show that the DOJ is currently focusing its enforcement
efforts on the most overt and egregious instances of fraud. When PPP
recipients use government funds for lavish expenses or use wholly fictitious
entities and documents, the fraud is easier to observe and prosecute.
However, going forward, the government will need to rely on
whistleblowers to uncover more covert schemes. Given the scope of the
PPP, these cases will take center stage in qui tam litigation for years to
come. Based on initial figures, the potential fraud could be in the tens of
187. Jonathan Ponciano, Big Banks Prioritized Billions in PPP Funds for Wealthy Clients
at the Expense of Struggling Small Businesses, House Report Finds, FORBES (Oct. 16, 2020,
4:36 PM), https://www.forbes.com/sites/jonathanponciano/2020/10/16/trump-admin-bigbanks-billions-ppp-funds-wealthy-clients-at-expense-of-struggling-small-businesses-house
-report/?sh=52e45f1c730b [https://perma.cc/Y6QM-5LJK].
188. Press Release, Off. of Pub. Affs., U.S. Dep’t of Just., Two Charged in Rhode Island
with Stimulus Fraud (May 5, 2020), https://www.justice.gov/opa/pr/two-charged-rhodeisland-stimulus-fraud [https://perma.cc/L5HW-RV55].
189. Press Release, Off. of Pub. Affs., U.S. Dep’t of Just., Department of Justice Is
Combatting COVID-19 Fraud but Reminds the Public to Remain Vigilant (Oct. 15, 2020),
https://www.justice.gov/opa/pr/department-justice-combatting-covid-19-fraud-reminds-pub
lic-remain-vigilant [https://perma.cc/UCC9-3E8S].
190. See Press Release, Off. of Pub. Affs., U.S. Dep’t of Just., Florida Man Who Used
COVID-Relief Funds to Purchase Lamborghini Sports Car Charged in Miami Federal Court
(July 27, 2020), https://www.justice.gov/opa/pr/florida-man-who-used-covid-relief-fundspurchase-lamborghini-sports-car-charged-miami-federal [https://perma.cc/9HRC-9AGS];
Press Release, Off. of Pub. Affs., U.S. Dep’t of Just., Texas Entrepreneur Charged with
Spending COVID Relief Funds on Improper Expenses Including Lamborghini and Strip
Club (Aug. 4, 2020), https://www.justice.gov/opa/pr/texas-entrepreneur-charged-spendingcovid-relief-funds-improper-expenses-including [https://perma.cc/V2NZ-GP24].
191. See, e.g., Press Release, Off. of Pub. Affs., U.S. Dep’t of Just., North Carolina Man
Charged with Fraudulently Seeking Over $6 Million in COVID Relief Funds (Sept. 29,
2020), https://www.justice.gov/opa/pr/north-carolina-man-charged-fraudulently-seekingover-6-million-covid-relief-funds [https://perma.cc/7MYG-8ED8] (alleging that the
defendant used fictitious businesses with Game of Thrones themed businesses names to
obtain loans, including “White Walker, Khaleesi, and The Night’s Watch”).
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billions. A recent report by the Inspector General of the Small Business
Administration (SBA) estimates that the agency approved $78 billion in
loans to potentially fraudulent or otherwise ineligible borrowers.192
The government has already hinted at its willingness to extend its
enforcement actions beyond the initial criminal cases noted above. The
SBA, which administers the PPP, recently began circulating “loan
necessity” questionnaires to entities who received loans of $2 million or
more.193 Recall that all PPP applicants were required to certify their need
for the loans during the application process.194 Larger companies that took
PPP loans may find themselves in the FCA’s crosshairs if they are unable
to convince the SBA that their certifications were made in good faith.
Potential whistleblowers in these areas may encounter original source
challenges. A potential qui tam case arising after these loan-necessity
questionnaires may need to show that the relator can materially add to the
government’s existing investigation, if such investigations have become
public. Given the difficulty of proving scienter—especially in the case of
corporate defendants—a whistleblower with inside information showing
that a company knew its PPP certifications were false at the time of
submission would be invaluable to the government’s investigation.
B. Waivers of Medicare and Medicaid Regulations
Whistleblowers currently bringing Medicare and Medicaid FCA cases
will need to navigate a changing landscape of government regulation. It
may come as no surprise that the COVID-19 pandemic necessitated changes
to the government’s regulation of its healthcare programs. As a defendant’s
adherence—or lack thereof—to these complex regulatory regimes is the
backbone of Medicare and Medicaid FCA cases, whistleblowers and their
attorneys will need to stay abreast of these changes, both to identify new
areas of potential fraud and ensure that changes in the law have not negated
their fraud theory.
One of the most notable changes to Medicare and Medicaid regulations
are various waivers that the government implemented to ensure greater
access to healthcare amid the pandemic. Under section 1135 of the Social
Security Act, the government may temporarily waive or modify certain
Medicare and Medicaid requirements to ensure that healthcare services are
192. Jim Zarroli, Billions in COVID-19 Relief Loans May Have Been Handed out to
Scammers, Report Says, NPR (Oct. 28, 2020, 6:55 PM), https://www.npr.org/2020/10/28/92
8792199/billions-in-covid-19-relief-loans-may-have-been-handed-out-to-scammers-reportsa [https://perma.cc/2JN3-28M6].
193. Warmbrodt, supra note 186.
194. See supra note 184–85 and accompanying text.
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available.195 CMS has exercised that authority in a number of ways.196 For
example, it waived many requirements for telehealth services, including the
requirement for a video component, and expanded the types of practitioners
that can provide telehealth services.197
CMS also gave a blanket waiver to provisions of the Stark Law,198
which prohibits a physician from referring patients to a facility if the
referring physician has a financial relationship with that facility.199 A
self-referral may be temporarily permissible, if the referral itself is related
to COVID-19 and is within the disaster area.200 Moreover, CMS specified
eighteen types of referrals and remunerations that fell under the blanket
exception.201 While this blanket waiver is extensive, it does not nullify all
prohibitions of the Stark Law. Consequently, whistleblowers will need to
consult the exceptions closely when bringing Stark-based FCA claims.
Whether it is a telehealth waiver, a Stark waiver, or otherwise,
whistleblowers will need to be cautious when bringing FCA cases based on
actions that occurred during the pandemic. These waivers could have
significant impacts on a relator’s case. For example, it could influence the
damages calculation in a case. If a physician was improperly billing for
telehealth services, that wrongful conduct could have been temporarily
condoned by a waiver, excluding from the Government’s damages conduct
that would have been fraudulent on either end of the waiver period.
These waivers may also raise materiality issues for potential
whistleblowers. If the government overtly waived otherwise impermissible
billing practices, then violations of those regulations are not material to their
payment decision during the waiver period. That means fraudulent billing
could be material one day and immaterial the next. Carefully identifying
when the alleged fraud occurred is critical. To those unaware of the
waivers, innocent conduct during the waiver period may appear to be blatant

195. 42 U.S.C. § 1320b–5(b).
196. See, e.g., COVID-19 Emergency Declaration Blanket Waivers for Health Care
Providers, CTRS. FOR MEDICARE & MEDICAID SERVS. (Dec. 1, 2020), https://www.cms.gov/fi
les/document/summary-covid-19-emergency-declaration-waivers.pdf [https://perma.cc/6C
RC-KNHE].
197. Id. at 1.
198. Blanket Waivers of Section 1877(g) of the Social Security Act Due to Declaration of
COVID-19 Outbreak in the United States as a National Emergency, CTRS. FOR MEDICARE &
MEDICAID SERVS. (2020), https://www.cms.gov/files/document/covid-19-blanket-waiverssection-1877g.pdf [https://perma.cc/Q6CV-BAZX] [hereinafter Blanket Waivers of Section
1877(g)].
199. 42 U.S.C. § 1395nn (a)(1)(A).
200. Blanket Waivers of Section 1877(g), supra note 198, at 2.
201. Id. at 3–5.
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fraud. If a whistleblower does not carefully identify applicable waivers,
then the entirety of their allegations may be immaterial to the government’s
payment decision.
C. Government Procurement
As with any emergency, the federal government made substantial
purchases of supplies to address the pandemic. However, the level of
government purchases in response to the COVID-19 pandemic is
unprecedented. For example, the Department of Defense awarded a $104
million contract for 500 million safety syringes for the Department of
Health and Human Services’ Strategic National Stockpile as part of its
efforts to prepare for mass vaccinations.202 The government also made
significant investments in medical equipment and personal protective
equipment (PPE). In fact, the government has spent billions on ventilators
alone.203 The government also signed large contracts for vaccines,
including one with Johnson & Johnson for $1 billion.204 While early
indications of vaccine viability appear positive, many nations have hedged
their bets, placing massive orders on numerous unproven vaccines.205 With
such large expenditures, unscrupulous vendors will likely seek to profit off
the emergency.
One possible area of enforcement is in defective or worthless products.
Fighting this sort of emergency profiteering was the initial aim of the
FCA206 and remains relevant today. Amid the initial scramble to acquire
202. Press Release, Dep’t of Def., DOD Awards $104 Million for Procurement of
Syringes in Support of U.S. COVID-19 Vaccination Campaign (Aug. 5, 2020),
https://www.defense.gov/Newsroom/Releases/Release/Article/2302139/dod-awards-104-m
illion-for-procurement-of-syringes-in-support-of-us-covid-19-va/ [https://perma.cc/QU6DPXSR].
203. HHS Announces New Ventilator Contracts, Orders Now Totaling Over 130,000
Ventilators, U.S. DEP’T OF HEALTH & HUM. SERVS. (Apr. 13, 2020), https://www.hhs.gov/ab
out/news/2020/04/13/hhs-announces-new-ventilator-contracts-orders-now-totaling-over-13
0000-ventilators.html [https://perma.cc/ZRV3-TTPV] (announcing various government
contracts for ventilators including contracts for $552 million, $407.9 million, and $350.1
million).
204. Sydney Lupkin, HHS Released More Coronavirus Vaccine Contracts as Election
Results Unfolded, NPR (Nov. 8, 2020, 2:16 PM), https://www.npr.org/sections/health-shots/
2020/11/08/932793698/hhs-released-more-coronavirus-vaccine-contracts-as-election-result
s-unfolded [https://perma.cc/9QCY-6LND].
205. Sarah Boseley, The Covid-19 Vaccine Gamble: Where Bets Have Been Placed and
Why, GUARDIAN (Sept. 11, 2020), https://www.theguardian.com/world/2020/sep/11/thecovid-19-vaccine-gamble-where-bets-have-been-placed-and-why [https://perma.cc/6EQ4GQ82].
206. See discussion supra Section I.B.
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necessary medical equipment and PPE, reports began of defective or
substandard products. In one instance, the Federal Emergency Management
Agency (FEMA) sent $134 million in supplies to 15,000 nonprofit nursing
care facilities, which were struggling to address the health emergency amid
budgetary shortfalls and product shortages.207 These shipments included
loose gloves in unmarked Ziploc bags, surgical masks made from
underwear fabric, and isolation gowns without openings in the sleeves.208
While FEMA responded to these complaints and tried to rectify the issue on
its own, this incident shows the potential for widespread FCA procurement
cases. Given the high demand for these products and the inevitable shortage
caused by that demand, some contractors will undoubtedly supply defective
or useless products to the government.
Issues of price gouging may also arise in these large procurement
contracts. In the early days of the pandemic, price gouging of consumer
products appeared repeatedly in news headlines.209 However, these
opportunistic tactics were aimed at government purchasers as well as the
general public. For example, during the height of the pandemic, New York
State reportedly paid fifteen times the normal price for medical
equipment.210 As the state languished under staggering death tolls,
profiteering sellers charged the state exorbitant prices, including “20 cents
for gloves that normally cost less than a nickel . . . . And $248,841 for a
portable X-ray machine that typically sells for $30,000 to $80,000.”211
Governments were desperate to pay these price gougers as shortages arose.
Houston’s mayor even submitted a bid of $4 per N95 mask and was
nonetheless outbid.212
These issues also impacted the federal
government.213 The United States Coast Guard ordered 1 million N95 face
207. Andrew Jacobs, FEMA Sends Faulty Protective Gear to Nursing Homes Battling
Virus, N.Y. TIMES (July 28, 2020), https://www.nytimes.com/2020/07/24/health/coronavirus
-nursing-homes-PPE.html [https://perma.cc/B4YN-HFJ7].
208. Id.
209. See, e.g., Richard Stradling, Company Agrees to Pay $150,000 to Settle Claims of
N95 Mask Price Gouging in NC, NEWS & OBSERVER (Oct. 30, 2020, 12:22 PM),
https://www.newsobserver.com/news/coronavirus/article246831437.html [https://perma.cc/
CMZ6-VM4L]; Michael Levenson, Price Gouging Complaints Surge Amid Coronavirus
Pandemic, N.Y. TIMES (Mar. 27, 2020), https://www.nytimes.com/2020/03/27/us/coronavir
us-price-gouging-hand-sanitizer-masks-wipes.html [https://perma.cc/8C6Z-CAR9].
210. Lydia DePillis & Lisa Song, In Desperation, New York State Pays up to 15 Times
the Normal Prices for Medical Equipment, PROPUBLICA (Apr. 2, 2020, 1:20 PM),
https://www.propublica.org/article/in-desperation-new-york-state-pays-up-to-15-times-thenormal-price-for-medical-equipment [https://perma.cc/9EDD-YUWR].
211. Id.
212. Id.
213. Id.
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masks for $5 apiece, downgraded the order to 200,000 masks, then
eventually cancelled the order entirely.214
These stories highlight the reality that even the government can be held
hostage by profiteering price gougers in an emergency where supplies
dwindle and the need for emergency supplies remains high. The sheer
volume of government purchases during the pandemic will likely ensure
that these issues remain at the forefront of FCA litigation for years to come.
Whistleblowers seeking to combat these issues should be prepared for
a materiality fight. Sellers who provided substandard goods may argue that
the government’s extreme need for medical equipment and its repeated
acceptance of such goods indicate a lack of materiality.215 However, the
proper analysis is whether the defendant knowingly provided defective
goods to the government with knowledge that the state of the goods was
material, which would establish materiality.216 Price gouging defendants
may attempt to argue that the government was willing to pay exorbitant
prices due to high demand and inadequate supply. However, this does not
exempt sellers from offering most-favored-customer pricing.217 For
example, if a seller offered a higher price to a hard-hit government, like
New York State, demand may well be high and the state may be forced to
accept; however, if that seller provided others with a more typical price,
they may be liable under a state FCA.218 Moreover, historical pricing and
prices offered by other sellers may serve as a basis for FCA liability.219
Prospective relators seeking to bring pandemic procurement cases should
prepare for these defense arguments.
D. The American Rescue Plan Act of 2021
These initial relief efforts are just the tip of the iceberg when it comes
to the government’s unprecedented spending to address the pandemic. In
March 2021, Congress passed the American Rescue Plan Act of 2021.220
This newest round of spending dwarfed the CARES Act, with a total

214. Id.
215. See Universal Health Servs., Inc. v. United States ex rel. Escobar, 136 S. Ct. 1989,
1994 (2016).
216. See id.; see also United States v. Triple Canopy, Inc., 857 F.3d 174, 177 (4th Cir.
2017) (discussing Escobar’s materiality standards).
217. See discussion supra Section III.B.
218. Id.
219. Id.
220. American Rescue Plan Act of 2021, Pub. L. No. 117-2.
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taxpayer price tag of $1.9 trillion.221 While some are calling the law an
overreach—with only 9% of funds directly aimed at COVID-19—and
others are defending it as a holistic economic recovery plan,222 one thing is
clear: continued government expenditures ensure the need for the FCA and
its whistleblowers.
The law contains divergent efforts running the gamut of government
spending. In addition to high-profile expenditures, like direct stimulus
payments,223 the law includes an additional $7.25 billion in PPP funding.224
It also includes significant expenditures on medical supplies and services,
like the law’s $7.5 billion appropriation for COVID-19 vaccines.225 The
law’s spending goes on to include a host of grants, including those for
mental health services,226 substance abuse,227 rural health care,228 and
childcare and development,229 just to name a few. And the law makes
numerous changes to Medicare and Medicaid policies.230 With such
massive payments and regulatory changes, fraud is sure to occur. In fact,
the law itself recognizes this reality with multiple appropriations for various
OIG offices for their oversight activities, many in the millions of dollars.231
While the wide-ranging expenditures of the American Rescue Plan Act
are far too numerous to be discussed fully here, the implication is clear. We
will need decades—at least—to understand how much of taxpayer funds
were diverted to fraudsters, rather than put to their intended use. Along the
way, we will need the assistance of whistleblowers and clarity in the FCA
to recoup as much waste as possible.

221. Barbara Sprunt, Here’s What’s in the American Rescue Plan, NPR (Mar. 11, 2021,
2:39 PM), https://www.npr.org/sections/coronavirus-live-updates/2021/03/09/974841565/h
eres-whats-in-the-american-rescue-plan-as-it-heads-toward-final-passage [https://perma.cc/
BMA5-TC22].
222. Id.
223. American Rescue Plan Act of 2021 § 6428B.
224. Id. § 5001.
225. Id. § 2301.
226. Id. § 2701.
227. Id. § 2706.
228. Id. § 5001.
229. Id. § 2201.
230. See id. §§ 9811–9819, 9831–9833.
231. See, e.g., id. § 9833 (providing a $5 million appropriation for OIG of the Department
of Health and Human Services); § 2012 (providing a $5 million appropriation to OIG of the
Department of Education); § 1004 (providing a $2.5 million dollar appropriation for OIG of
the Department of Agriculture); § 2904 (providing a $500,000 appropriation for OIG for the
Railroad Retirement Board).
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CONCLUSION
The massive expanse of government spending, and the resultant fraud
that is sure to follow, highlights the need for the FCA and its whistleblowers
throughout this pandemic. Since its inception, this law has been the
government’s most effective tool to combat fraud, waste, and abuse of
government assets. Much of the fraud perpetrated against the government
would go undetected without whistleblowers who are willing to take the
risk to speak out. The FCA has proven its effectiveness time and time again,
recouping nearly $60 billion in public funds since its 1986 amendment. As
we move into an era of increased government spending to address the
pandemic, this law is more critical than ever.
In response to this need, all FCA players need to focus on making this
law the most effective fraud fighting tool possible. Critical to this endeavor
is clarifying existing law. Congress should work to statutorily clarify the
materiality standard, giving potential whistleblowers greater clarity in
assessing their claims when making a decision on whether to risk speaking
out. All government actors should also seek to rein in unnecessary
dismissals of meritorious qui tam actions. The Granston Memo and the
Swift court’s deference to the DOJ’s dismissal authority threaten the success
of the FCA as a whole. This issue can be addressed on multiple fronts.
Congress can seek to clarify its initial intent in requiring a hearing before
dismissal. The DOJ itself can rein in its use of dismissal, trusting in the
ability of the FCA to net the government more resources, rather than
viewing it as a drain on resources. At the very least, the DOJ should allow
whistleblowers to continue to litigate cases without intervention, trusting
the relator’s bar to fight vigorously to protect government resources.
Finally, courts should take a less deferential approach to the DOJ’s
dismissal authority, allowing whistleblowers to have their day in court.
The massive spending efforts of the government in response to the
pandemic require the aid of qui tam whistleblowers to protect this
investment. The CARES Act and the American Rescue Plan Act were
unprecedented stimulus efforts. However, that investment to protect small
businesses will be squandered if resources are diverted to otherwise secure
businesses and fraudsters seeking to enrich themselves. While the
government must often rely on the submissions of those seeking payment,
whistleblowers with inside knowledge can help uncover otherwise
undiscoverable fraud. Whistleblowers must also continue their important
work in limiting fraud against government healthcare programs while
remaining vigilant of a changing regulatory landscape. Finally, the
government must rely on whistleblowers and the FCA to uncover issues in
its procurement contracts. With this level of purchasing, there are
undoubtedly significant sums that have been diverted either through price
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gouging, substandard products, or otherwise. As always, whistleblowers
are necessary in bringing undiscovered fraud to light and protecting the
public from fraud.
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